

peace—without our offering the formal recognition which they have craved for so long.

Now we face the prospect of a recognized, ethnically cleansed Bosnian Serb entity in a shotgun marriage with the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina that is struggling to maintain the ideals of multiethnic tolerance and compromise. Can one blame the citizens of Sarajevo, Moslems, Croats, Serbs, Jews, and other nationalities, for feeling betrayed?

What is the lesson that other potential ethnic cleansers will learn from this carve-up?

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke was quoted in the *New York Times* as worrying about the implementation of the details of this strange and contradictory government structure. And well he should worry. But it is the violence done to fundamental principles of decency and democracy that is the real tragedy, not how the mugging is accomplished.

In conceiving both the peace framework and the latest cease-fire, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke has relied on Milosevic to deliver. According to the same *New York Times* article, Mr. Holbrooke praised the Serbian strongman as a peacemaker.

Mr. Holbrooke is, of course, entitled to his opinion, which is no doubt well-informed. However, I also have dealt personally with Mr. Milosevic, and I much prefer the portrayal of him given by our former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman: A habitual liar who condoned and organized unspeakable atrocities.

Mr. President, these are not just harmless differences of opinion. Rather, they impact directly on the chances for the cease-fire and the peace settlement succeeding.

Because I consider Milosevic to be a liar and a war criminal, I am not at all surprised that he has continued to support the Bosnian Serbs with weapons, training, and vital infrastructural assistance—even during the NATO bombing campaign of the last 2 weeks—all the while assuring us that he has abandoned Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs in Pale.

I would ask, what is the next step? Are we to reward Milosevic's brazen duplicity with further sanctions of relief for Serbia?

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke was quoted as saying that we did not sell out the Bosnian Moslems. "They wanted this agreement," he assured the *New York Times*. "They knew this was a good deal."

Well, I hope so, but pardon my skepticism. Other than having to abandon their ideal of a unitary, multiethnic State, the Moslem-led Bosnian Government has had to put up with criticism this past week for having had the nerve to launch an offensive with their Bosnian Croat allies to try to liberate parts of western Bosnia that were ethnically cleansed of Moslems and Croats in 1992.

And we certainly do not want to offend the Russians. These are the people who this week accused NATO of genocide for its bombing campaign specifically targeted to avoid civilian areas, even when it meant sparing legitimate military targets.

Other than desecrating the memory of millions of people who really did die as a result of genocide, the Russians with their apoplectic rhetoric and big lie techniques make even the most well-disposed American wonder if much has changed since the bad, old days of Soviet rule in the Kremlin.

So what do we do? If one is to believe press reports, we contemplate a deal that puts Russian forces around Sarajevo to enforce the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs' heavy weapons.

This would be a master stroke! We would now put the fate of the long-suffering citizens of the Bosnian capital in the hands of people for whom Bosnian Serb war crimes are allegedly part of a people's struggle for existence.

Suppose, just suppose, that the unthinkable happens and the Bosnian Serbs cheat on the deal and the Russians back them up. Now instead of having the option of resuming the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs, we would have to worry about hitting Russian soldiers.

Mr. President, this reported part of the deal is so incredible that at first I could only believe that it was some sort of a trial balloon. This morning the White House told my staff that it may have been a deliberate piece of disinformation by the Russians. I hope so, because the idea is a nonstarter.

What is the role of Congress in this peace process? In order to cement the bargain the Congress apparently will be asked to pony up half-a-billion dollars as a downpayment on an even larger aid package to follow.

And, as the final stroke, we will be asked to send American soldiers to Bosnia and Herzegovina as apartheid cops to enforce the destruction of the unitary, multiethnic State.

Well this Senator is frankly revolted at the whole thing. Will we be asked to bankroll the fiefdom of the war criminals Mladic and Karadzic who orchestrated vile ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, and mass murder all across Bosnia?

Moreover, now that our pilots have bombed the Bosnian Serbs—as they rightfully have done—does anyone seriously think that Americans would be treated by the Bosnian Serbs as just any old neutral peacekeepers?

Mr. President, I realize that Mr. Holbrooke and his team have worked long and hard and in good faith. I also understand that we are describing work in progress.

But let these concerns that I have raised today be viewed unambiguously as a shot across the bow of the administration's Bosnian peace flotilla: Do not come to Congress with a bad peace to end a bad war.

It has not worked in the past. It cannot work in the future. And Congress, I

am confident, will not approve it this time.

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT ON TURKEY

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the August recess two members of the Foreign Relations Committee minority staff traveled to Turkey at my direction to assess a range of issues related to United States-Turkish bilateral relations. Turkey, one of the largest recipients of United States military assistance, is an important United States ally in a dangerous and unstable region. It is therefore, incumbent upon us to take a close look at what is occurring in Turkey—the threats to its security, its political struggles, and its human rights situation. In particular, I asked my staff to focus on Turkey's Kurdish problem, which has broad implications for regional stability, as well as Turkey's relations with the West.

Among the staff's findings is that the Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK] poses a grave threat not only to Turkey, but to regional stability as well. At the same time, the Government of Turkey is unable—or unwilling—to distinguish the genuine threat posed by the PKK from the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people. Turkey is responding with a heavy-handed, indiscriminate military campaign against the Kurds, even as it shuts off opportunities for nonviolent, Kurdish political expression. Consequently, Turkey may be fomenting, rather than preventing Kurdish separatism.

I believe this report makes an important contribution to the Congress' consideration of the United States approach toward Turkey. I ask unanimous consent that the "Summary of Key Findings" be placed into the RECORD at this point, and would commend the full report, which is available at the Foreign Relations Committee office, to my colleagues' attention.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Turkey, which places a high priority on good relations with the West in general and the United States in particular, is an important U.S. ally in a dangerous and unstable neighborhood: Three of its immediate neighbors—Iran, Iraq, and Syria—are on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; it is engaged in an economic and political competition with Russia for influence in and access to the resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus; there is ongoing conflict to Turkey's north—in Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey is not, however, a disinterested in neutral party, it is openly sympathetic to Azerbaijan's position, and although it has opened an air corridor to Armenia, Turkey maintains a road and rail blockade; it continues to spar with Greece over Cyprus and other issues, in particular, a dispute over maritime boundaries in the wake of Greece's ratification of the Law of the Sea treaty threatens to bring Turkey and Greece into outright conflict.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) poses a grave threat not only to Turkey, but to regional stability as well. The PKK—which employs deadly terrorist tactics against innocent noncombatants in Turkey and

against innocent civilians elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe—bears direct responsibility for much of the tensions in southeast Turkey and for prompting the recent Turkish invasions of Iraq.

Operation Provide Comfort, the allied humanitarian and security operation in Northern Iraq, is a critical element of U.S. and Western strategies with regard to Iraq, and may be the only thing preventing tens of thousands of Kurds from pouring into southeastern Turkey. Although some Turkish officials recognize these facts and military officials at Incirlik have provided splendid cooperation to their British, French and American counterparts, other Turkish military and political officials (including parliamentarians) argue that Provide Comfort offers the PKK protection and cover in Northern Iraq. This rather schizophrenic view of Provide Comfort makes Turkey appear a reluctant participant in the allied effort, which Turkey has exploited to its advantage in dealings with its allies.

In keeping with traditions established during the days of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, Turkey has an almost paranoid fear of losing its Turkish identity. The government of Turkey accordingly is unable—or unwilling—to distinguish the genuine threat posed by the PKK from the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people. As a result, Turkey refuses to engage in a political dialogue with nonviolent Kurdish representatives, and is executing a heavy-handed, indiscriminate military campaign to eradicate what it views as a monolithic threat to the unity of the country.

The city of Diyarbakir, which symbolizes the ethnic difficulties that persist within Turkey, has become a haven for rural Kurds forced to evacuate neighboring towns and villages destroyed by the Turkish military. By some estimates, the city's population has grown from roughly 300,000 to more than 1,500,000 during the past five years. Although Turkish officials, local residents, and some independent observers suggest that tensions have subsided during the past two years, it is evident that any existing calm is tenuous and the result of Turkey's overwhelming—and at times oppressive—security presence, which has exacted a high cost in terms of human rights violations.

Turkey's government refuses even to acknowledge that there is a "Kurdish problem," and thereby is ignoring the real issue. By equating all Kurdish aspirations with the terrorist designs of the PKK, Turkey effectively has eliminated outlets for nonviolent Kurdish political or cultural expression. As a consequence, Turkey unintentionally may be contributing to the PKK's appeal.

Turkey desperately wants to join the European Union's Customs Union, and is making some effort to meet the European Parliament's minimum demands regarding democratization and human rights in order to achieve membership. It may even make some modifications to Article 8 of the Anti-Terror law (which prohibits the advocacy of separatism). Turkey will not, however, take any action which it perceives as comprising the Turkish identity, so there are limits to the amount of genuine change it will make to gain membership in the Customs Union. It is equally unclear that the West would have much impact on Turkish behavior by withholding benefits such as Customs Union membership.

Despite claims that it regards fundamentalism as a threat to its secular heritage, the government of Turkey appears to be encouraging and even sponsoring Islamic activities in an attempt to bind the country together and defuse separatist sentiment. Such a strategy—which parallels efforts of governments in the Near East seeking to counter radical

leftist groups during the 1970s and early 1980s—could backfire and inadvertently provide a foothold for Islamic extremists.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

1441. A communication from the Administrator of the Panama Canal Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1994; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1442. A communication from the Associate Attorney General, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1994; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1443. A communication from the Associate Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the activities and operations of The Public Integrity Section for calendar years 1992 and 1993; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1444. A communication from the Inspector General of the Railroad Retirement Board, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the budget request for fiscal year 1997; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

1445. A communication from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the Council on Alzheimer's Disease for fiscal year 1994; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

1446. A communication from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting pursuant to law, the report entitled, "Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Prevention: The National Structured Evaluation"; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

1447. A communication from the Director of Health Care Delivery and Quality Issues, the General Accounting Office, transmitting, the report entitled, "VA Health Care: Need for Brevard Hospital Not Justified"; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

1448. A communication from the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on veterans' employment in the Federal Government for fiscal years 1993 and 1994; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. JEFFORDS, from the Committee on Appropriations, without amendment:

S. 1244. An original bill making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 104-144).

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. JEFFORDS:

S. 1244. An original bill making appropriations for the government of the District of

Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes; from the Committee on Appropriations; placed on the calendar.

By Mr. ASHCROFT (for himself, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. BOND, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. HATCH, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. KYL, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. GRAMM):

S. 1245. A bill to amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to identify violent and hard-core juvenile offenders and treat them as adults, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WARNER:

S. 1246. A bill to amend titles 5 and 37, United States Code, to provide for the continuance of pay and the authority to make certain expenditures and obligations during lapses in appropriations; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself, Mr. KYL, and Mr. NICKLES):

S. 1247. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a deduction for contributions to a medical savings account by any individual who is covered under a catastrophic coverage health plan; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. WELLSTONE (for himself, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. KERREY, Mr. CONRAD, and Mr. DORGAN):

S. 1248. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the alcohol fuels credit to be allocated to patrons of a cooperative in certain cases; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. FRIST:

S. 1249. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to establish medical savings account, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. DOLE:

S. Res. 172. A resolution providing for severance pay; considered and agreed to.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. ASHCROFT (for himself, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. BOND, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. HATCH, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. KYL, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. GRAMM):

S. 1245. A bill to amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to identify violent and hard-core juvenile offenders and treat them as adults, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

THE VIOLENT AND HARD-CORE JUVENILE OFFENDER REFORM ACT OF 1995

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, along with Senators ABRAHAM, BOND, COCHRAN, DEWINE, HATCH, INHOFE, KYL, MCCAIN, SIMPSON, and THURMOND, I am pleased to introduce the Violent and Hard-Core Juvenile Offender Reform Act of 1995. The crime epidemic sweeping across our country—growing with each passing year—can be attributed,